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9.1  Introduction 
The growing population of elderly persons in the United States poses many 
challenges for American society and policymakers; some of  the most im- 
portant challenges involve providing appropriate housing for the elderly who 
suffer from health-related disabilities. 
Elderly persons are vulnerable to a wide spectrum of  disabilities, of  dif- 
fering degrees of severity, creating a need for many different kinds of elderly 
housing and home services, extending from the demand for homes with partic- 
ular architectural features, like wheelchair access, through the need for home 
health care and basic community services, to requirements of severely disabled 
individuals for intensive nursing home care. During the past few decades the 
need for these many  kinds of  housing has been widely recognized, and the 
growth in alternative elderly housing arrangements holds out the promise of a 
world in which each elderly person is matched to his or her “ideal” kind of 
housing, and, when the person’s health status changes, he or she moves into a 
new preferred housing state. 
Although this vision is appealing, it ignores a number of important issues, 
especially the role of mobility costs and economic factors in elderly housing 
decisions. Previous research supports the view that most elderly persons who 
have lived in their dwelling for an extended period of time prefer not to move, 
if possible; see for example Feinstein and McFadden (1989), Venti and Wise 
(1989), and Sheiner and Weil(1992), all of whom document the fact that mo- 
bility rates are very low among the elderly. In part the unwillingness  of elderly 
persons to  move derives from the emotional attachment they feel to their 
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homes (see Danigelis and Fengler 1991), and in part it derives from the very 
high costs that moving imposes on the elderly, including psychological,  health- 
related, and financial costs (see Golant 1984). The elderly often seem more 
willing to endure the daily hardships and inconveniences caused by  the mis- 
match between their impaired functional skills and those demanded by  their 
living environment, than to bear the high cost of moving. The fact that an el- 
derly person may not wish to move as her health deteriorates significantly com- 
plicates the simple vision that imagines perfectly matching housing to health 
status, and suggests that attachment behavior and mobility costs must be in- 
cluded in any policy analysis that seeks to evaluate the attractiveness and likely 
utilization of alternative housing options. 
In addition, housing of almost any kind is expensive to own or to rent, and 
many kinds of home-related health services, notably nursing care, are also ex- 
tremely costly. Hence elderly housing decisions invariably depend upon the 
prices of the various housing options, expected changes in those prices, and 
household wealth, and we are linked to decisions about consumption and de- 
sired bequests, themselves complex topics that have been widely investigated 
(see the survey by  Hurd [1990]). Again, comprehensive analyses of elderly 
housing must consider the effect of prices, and the link between housing deci- 
sions and other economic decisions made by elderly households. 
My purpose in this paper is to investigate the relationship between elderly 
health and elderly housing decisions, and, in particular, to examine the effect 
of mobility costs and economic factors on this relationship. To  explore these 
issues, I construct a conventional dynamic economic model, draw upon pub- 
lished sources to parameterize the model, and then present the results of com- 
puter simulations that I have used to characterize the model’s implications. I 
actually construct two models, the first simpler and designed to illustrate the 
main ways in which health and housing interact, and the second extending the 
first to incorporate economic factors. 
The two models share a number of features that are central to my investiga- 
tion. Both follow an elderly person from age 65 through age 90, determining 
the individual’s  mobility decision and housing choice at each age, as a function 
of sex, health status, and previous year’s housing state. Both also employ par- 
ticular parameterizations of morbidity and mortality transition probabilities, 
based on published sources, which specify an individual’s future health status, 
as a function of  age, sex, and current health. Finally, in modeling health and 
housing states, both models consider a world in which an elderly person can 
fall into one of three health states, good health, moderate disability, or poor 
health, and must choose to live in one of three housing states: conventional 
(nonelderly specific) housing; transitional housing, which is meant to include 
a variety of housing options, including retirement communities, life care (see 
Feinstein and Keating 1992  for a discussion), and shared living; or institutional 
housing, including nursing homes and hospices. 
Within this general context the first model focuses on two issues. First, it 277  Elderly Health, Housing, and Mobility 
introduces a simple utility function that assumes that an individual’s utility is 
highest when his residence type “matches” his health status, and lower when 
the two are mismatched; according to this specification a moderately disabled 
individual is happiest living in transitional housing, and earns lower utility in 
either conventional housing or an institution, while a person in good health 
prefers conventional housing, and a person in poor health does best in an insti- 
tution. Second, this first model considers several kinds of mobility costs, in- 
cluding a separation or attachment cost, a direct but temporary utility cost, and 
a health cost. 
The analysis of the first model confirms that when there are no mobility 
costs an individual will always move in response to changes in his health status 
(into his new preferred housing state), and that moving costs reduce mobility, 
with higher costs reducing mobility to a greater extent. More interestingly, the 
analysis highlights the importance of transitional housing. I find that for most 
parameterizations  individuals who fall into moderate disability choose to move 
into transitional housing. In contrast, individuals who fall into poor health of- 
ten choose not to move into an institution, even in versions of the model with 
relatively low mobility costs, and especially at younger ages. When combined, 
as they are in many of the simulations, these two patterns result in transitional 
housing playing the role of an “absorbing state,” so that once an elderly person 
moves into such housing she stays there for the rest of her life. As a related 
finding, a mobility pattern rarely observed is one in which an elderly person 
skips over transitional housing, choosing not to move from conventional hous- 
ing into transitional housing when first becoming moderately disabled, and 
then moving directly into an institution when she falls into poor health. 
The second model extends the first to place greater emphasis on household 
wealth and bequest, to incorporate housing prices, and, most importantly, to 
model the individual’s  consumption decision each period jointly with his hous- 
ing decision. The simulation results for this model generally confirm the find- 
ings for the first model, particularly the importance of  transitional housing. 
The results also illustrate the link between consumption, savings, spend down 
of assets, and housing choices; for example, elderly with very low wealth are 
predicted to follow a “bankruptcy” strategy in which they consume their re- 
maining wealth, then move into an institution where they become a ward of the 
state. Generally, both the first and second model seem able to predict realistic 
mobility patterns, offering support for the augmented economic model of el- 
derly decision making that I develop. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The section 9.2 de- 
scribes the first model, including the parameterizations  of the health transition 
matrices and other key variables. Section 9.3 presents the simulation results 
for the first model. Section 9.4 describes the second model, and section 9.5 
presents the simulation results for this model. Finally, section 9.6 offers some 
concluding comments, and an appendix discusses the procedure used to con- 
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9.2  Initial Model: Specification and Parameterization 
In this section I present an initial, relatively simple model of elderly health 
and mobility. This first model assumes that an elderly person’s utility in any 
year depends only on the match between housing type and health in that year, 
and on whether the person has moved in the current or previous year. Lifetime 
utility is assumed to be equal to the sum of discounted annual utilities, plus a 
bequest. Since it is focused almost entirely on the relationship between health 
and housing, the model is well suited to an investigation of the relationship 
between changes in health status and both housing mobility and housing char- 
acteristics, as I hope to show in section 9.3, where I review the results of simu- 
lating the model. However, the model cannot address how elderly health status 
and mobility costs affect and are affected by financial incentives and economic 
decisions, because it includes only a very limited role for household wealth 
(restricting its impact to the bequest), and does not incorporate any role for 
annuity income, housing prices, or consumption decisions. The second model, 
presented in section 9.4, extends the model of  this section to include these 
various factors. 
In presenting the model, I first define the various health states, health transi- 
tion probabilities, and housing states used in the analysis. Next I describe util- 
ity, and two kinds of mobility costs, direct utility costs of moving and indirect 
health costs. Finally I consider the elderly person’s decision-making  process in 
more detail, outlining the dynamic programming method of  analysis I have 
used to determine the mobility patterns implied by the model. Since I analyze 
the model via computer simulations, I must parameterize several different 
functions and distributions  that appear in the model, including health transition 
probabilities, mortality profiles, and utility. The parameterizations I have cho- 
sen are described together with the model, and presented in several tables, with 
the appendix providing greater details about the sources and methods used to 
construct these tables. For completeness and to provide greater understanding 
of how sensitive the model’s solution is to changes in parameterization, sepa- 
rate parameterizations are specified for men and women. 
I end this brief introduction to the model with two notes. First, most aspects 
of  the model, including the parameterizations, are carried over to the model 
presented in section 9.4. Second, throughout the paper the analysis is couched 
in terms of a single elderly person (a one-person household), either male or 
female; the extension to an elderly couple, possibly living with or as depen- 
dents, is important but is left to future work. 
9.2.1  Health and Housing States 
Consider a 65-year-old man or woman, who lives alone but is assumed to 
have heirs who will inherit any remaining wealth, including housing wealth, 
when he or she dies. The man or woman is assumed to be in good health, and 
to own his or her home. 279  Elderly Health, Housing, and Mobility 
Beginning at age 66, and for each year thereafter, the individual faces a risk 
of deteriorating health or death. To formalize this risk and the different levels 
of ill health associated with it, I assume that in each year for which she remains 
alive the individual finds herself in one of three health states: “good health,” 
“moderately disabled health,” or “poor health.” I define good, moderately disa- 
bled, and poor health in terms of limitations of activities of daily living (ADLs) 
and instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs), so as to conform with stan- 
dard gerontologic terminology. Thus “good health” means that the individual 
has essentially no limitations of daily life, that is, zero ADLs and zero to two 
IADLs. A person in “moderately disabled health” suffers from several IADLs 
and perhaps one or two ADLs. Such an individual is likely to endure minor or 
moderate inconveniences in a traditional family home, particularly if there are 
stairs or other encumbrances, and may benefit from living in an environment 
of congregate or shared housing, a suitable retirement community, or simply a 
well-designed apartment with ready access to transportation, shopping, and 
other activities (see Altman, Lawton, and Wohlwill 1984 for a fuller discus- 
sion). Someone in “poor health” possesses significant limitations, including 
several ADL limitations and numerous IADL limitations. Thus “poor health” 
is, as defined, approximately equivalent to the condition of patients who would 
benefit from consideration for, are resident in, or are about to be admitted to a 
long-term care facility such as a nursing home. The fact that these definitions 
mesh with standard gerontologic terminology is critical for my analysis, be- 
cause the published data I have  relied upon to parameterize the model de- 
scribes health status almost exclusively in terms of ADL and IADL limitations. 
An individual of given health status at age t will, at age t + 1, either be in 
one of the three health states described above or be dead. Further, as will be- 
come clear later in this section, the elderly person’s decision whether to move 
at age t, and where to move, depends on his expectation of what his health is 
likely to be like at age t + 1 and subsequent ages. Thus a central feature of the 
model is the parameterization of  the transition probabilities that describe the 
movement from health states at age t to states at age t + 1. Tables 9.1 and 9.2 
depict these transition probabilities. Table 9.1 lists, for each age t and sepa- 
rately for men and women, the nine numbers contained in the three-by-three 
transition matrix that governs transitions from each health state at age t to each 
of the three living states at age t + 1; as the table makes clear, these probabili- 
ties are different at each age. Table 9.2 describes the mortality risk at age t + 
1, as a function of health at age t, again separately for men and women. 
The health transition probabilities depicted in tables 9.1 and 9.2 apply only 
to the case in which the individual does not move at age t, or moves but suffers 
no increased risk of ill health or death as a consequence. Later in this section 
I will describe how the numbers in tables 9.1 and 9.2 are altered, in models in 
which mobility is assumed to increase the risk of ill health and death, if  an 
elderly man or woman chooses to move at age t. 
The appendix provides details about the construction of tables 9.1 and 9.2. 280  Jonathan S. Feinstein 
Table 9.1  Probability of a Transition from One Health State to Another, by Age 
and Sex, Base Case 
From Good Health to  From Moderately Disabled to  From Poor Health to 




































































































































,0158  ,0730 
.0158  .0700 
,0158  ,0680 
,0158  .0650 
,0175  ,0630 
.0190  ,0610 
,0202  ,0590 
,0202  .0570 
,0202  .0550 
,0215  .0540 
,0230  .0530 
,0248  ,0500 
.0269  .0450 
.0292  ,0400 
.0316  ,0350 
,0345  .0300 
,0379  .0250 
.0420  ,0200 
,0472  ,0160 
,0525  ,0120 
.0602  ,0110 
,0682  ,0100 
,0765  .0100 
,0855  ,0100 
,0975  ,0100 















































,1000  .8535 
.0900  3.575 
.0800  ,8605 
.0800  ,8533 
.0750  ,8462 
,0700  .8445 
,0650  ,8485 
.0580  ,8515 
,0500  ,8575 
,0420  ,8592 
,0350  ,8595 
,0300  ,8580 
,0260  .8584 
,0220  ,8544 
.0190  .8483 
,0160  ,8431 
,0130  ,8415 
,0100  .8390 
.0395  .OOOO 
.0395  .oooO 
.0395  .oooO 
.0395  .oooO 
,0450  .oooO 
.0480  .oooO 
.0505  .oooO 
,0505  .OOOO 
,0505  .oooO 
,0520  .OOOO 
,0575  .OOOO 
,0620  .oooO 
.0672  .oooO 
,0730  .oooO 
,0758  .OOOO 
,0811  .oooO 
,0872  .oooO 
.0924  .oooO 
.0944  .OOOO 
.0950  .OOOO 
,1020  .oooO 
.lo90  .oooO 
,1150  .oooO 
,1280  .oooO 
,1460  .oooO 
,1570  .oooO 
,0395  .oooO 
,0395  .oooO 
,0395  .OOOO 
.0395  .oooO 
,0438  .oooO 
.0505  .oooO 
,0505  .oooO 
.0505  .oooO 
,0505  .oooO 
,0538  .oooO 
.0575  .oooO 
,0620  .oooO 
,0646  .oooO 
.0686  .oooO 
.0727  .oooO 
,0759  .oooO 
.0795  .oooO 
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Table 9.1  (continued) 























































































Table 9.2  Probability of Death in the Next Year as a Function of Current 
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Here I restrict myself to several brief comments about the tables. I have relied 
primarily on two sets of sources in constructing the tables. One source is the 
series of papers published by Manton and his coauthors, which present data 
from the National Long-Term Care Survey (see especially Manton 1988; see 
also Liu, Manton, and Liu 1990); these papers provide considerable informa- 
tion on the transitions between good health, moderate disability, and death. 
The other source is the tables presented in Feinstein and Keating (1992), which 
are derived from the National Nursing Home Survey and several econometric 
analyses of nursing home admissions and discharge data; these tables provide 
information about the transition into and out of what I have called poor health. 
The numbers in these two sources do not always agree; when they do not, the 
numbers in tables 9.1 and 9.2 generally represent a compromise  between them. 
In addition, the probabilities in the tables reflect smoothing, which was used 
to guarantee certain monotonicity properties over time, for example, that the 
probability a man in good health at age t remains in good health at age t + 1 
falls smoothly as t rises. One limitation of the tables is that the numbers con- 
tained in them refer to a representative or “base case” elderly man or woman; 
in reality, of course, elderly men, and elderly women, differ substantially  from 
one another in their actual morbidity and mortality experiences, and these indi- 
vidual differences are not captured by the tables. 
Just as a person finds herself in one of three health states in each year, she 
also occupies one of three kinds of housing. One kind of housing is denoted 
“conventional”; this housing, of which a good example is a detached single- 
family dwelling, is best suited to individuals in good health, and poses modest 
difficulties  for individuals in moderately disabled health, and severe difficulties 
for individuals in poor health. The second kind of housing is denoted “transi- 
tional,” and may be thought of as catering to the moderately disabled elderly 
person; included in this group are congregate and other kinds of shared hous- 
ing, retirement communities in which services are provided by management or 
are otherwise readily accessible, and other kinds of independent housing- 
generally apartments and flats-located  near transportation, shops, and other 
services. Finally, the third kind of  housing is “institutional care,” including 
nursing homes, hospices, and other kinds of intensive-care facilities. 
In introducing three housing states I am positing a slightly richer housing 
state space than has been used in most previous studies in the economics of 
aging, which have either focused exclusively on what I have called conven- 
tional housing, or have considered the dichotomous choice between conven- 
tional housing and institutional care. I am thus taking one step toward the di- 
rection  of  incorporating into  analytic model  building  the  vast  swath  of 
“transitional housing” available to the elderly. In fact, I am greatly simplifying 
the actual diversity of housing types available to elderly persons, since I have 
consolidated many different kinds of housing into the single category “tran- 
sitional’’; nonetheless, as the analysis to follow will demonstrate, even this 283  Elderly Health, Housing, and Mobility 
simple extension of  the standard approach yields  considerable  insight  into 
elderly mobility patterns. 
In each period the elderly person chooses whether to remain in the previous 
housing state, or to move to a new housing state. I discuss this decision-making 
process further below. 
9.2.2  Utility and Bequest 
The health and housing states described above are linked by a utility func- 
tion that specifies that utility in a given year depends upon the match between 
health and housing. The idea behind this formulation is that each health state 
has associated with it an ideal housing situation that provides the optimal mix- 
ture of support and amenities. Thus good health is most enjoyable if an elderly 
person  lives in conventional housing, with the many amenities that conven- 
tional homes afford, including privacy, space, and aesthetic value. In contrast, 
moderately disabled health is most successfully accommodated in transitional 
housing, in which an elderly person finds support that makes daily living easier 
and simpler, while maintaining a reasonable amount of freedom and indepen- 
dence. Finally, poor health is tolerated best if  the elderly person resides in a 
long-term care facility. 
The utility function formalizes the idea of an optimal match between health 
and housing by  letting utility  in a given year depend upon both health and 
housing state. For a given health state, utility is highest if a person resides in 
the home that matches that health state, as described above, and is reduced if 
the person resides in some other kind of home. Table 9.3 depicts the utility 
values used as benchmarks for most of  the simulations reported later in the 
paper. Utility is set to 1.0 if a person is healthy and resides in a conventional 
home. Utility falls to 0.9 if the person is healthy but lives in transitional hous- 
ing, and falls to 0.5 if the person is healthy but lives in an institution or equiva- 
lent. Similarly, if  a person is in moderately disabled health, utility attains its 
highest level, 0.7, if he lives in transitional housing, and falls to 0.4 if he lives 
in conventional housing or institutional housing. Finally, utility is 0.4 if a per- 
son in poor health lives in an institution, and falls to 0.1 and 0.2, respectively, 
if that person lives in conventional or transitional housing. Note that utility is 
assessed at the end of the period, so that, if a person moves, his utility in the 
year in question corresponds to the match between  his health and his  final 
housing state. 
The diagonal entries of the utility matrix correspond to the highest utility 
that can be achieved in each health state. The first diagonal element, 1.0, is a 
normalization, but the remaining  two diagonal entries reflect  the degree to 
which utility falls as health deteriorates, even when a person resides in an opti- 
mal  living  environment. The value  0.7  was  chosen to reflect  evidence  on 
health-dependent utilities presented by Torrance (1986) and Viscusi and Evans 
(1990) and the collection of  articles in Walker and Rosser (1993). Torrance 284  Jonathan S. Feinstein 
Table 9.3  Utility as a Function of Health and Housing, Base Case 
Parameterization 
Conventional 












discusses in some detail the methodologic underpinnings of using a quality 
adjusted life year (QALY) index to measure the disutility of  ill health, and 
provides estimates suggesting that a year spent in moderate ill health has a 
QALY-equivalent  of about .7 of that of  a year spent in good health. Viscusi and 
Evans estimate health-dependent utility functions, and find that the marginal 
utility of a given level of income is approximately .7 or .8 as large in states of 
moderate ill health as in states of good health; assuming a simple multiplicative 
form for utility (as I do in the model specified in section 9.4)  and that other 
forms of  consumption remain constant, generates the implication that a year 
spent in moderate ill health is worth .7 or .8 of a year spent in good health. The 
edited edition by Walker and Rosser contains descriptions of  several of  the 
most well-known indices used to measure quality of life. 
The value 0.4 was chosen based on consideration of  various sources that 285  Elderly Health, Housing, and Mobility 
describe the reductions in quality of life that accompany various kinds of disa- 
bilities; see the collection of papers in Walker and Rosser (1993) and Birren et 
al. (1991) for further discussion of the various indices used to assess the impact 
of disability. 
The off-diagonal elements in the utility matrix indicate the reduction in util- 
ity an elderly person experiences when she does not reside in the housing state 
that matches her health status. Since there is little direct evidence available that 
might help determine these values, I have tried to pick reasonable values. I have 
also explored the sensitivity  of my results to variations in the most important of 
these off-diagonal elements, which turns out to be element (2, l), which de- 
scribes the utility accruing to a moderately disabled person who lives in a con- 
ventional home. This particular element is important for several reasons. First, 
it describes the most common nonoptimal match: when an elderly person en- 
ters the model at age 65 in good health and living in conventional housing, the 
health transition that he is most likely to experience in subsequent years is to 
moderate disability, in which case, if  he chooses not to move, his utility is 
given by element (2, 1). Second, the model allows considerable discretion in 
the choice of this value, particularly as compared with the range of feasible 
values for the off-diagonal elements corresponding to the case of poor health. 
Thus utility for an individual whose health status is moderately disabled can 
rise as high as 0.7 if he chooses to live in transitional  housing, leaving consider- 
able latitude in the choice of how far utility falls if the individual instead lives 
in a different kind of housing; in contrast, for an individual in poor health, the 
highest utility he can achieve is 0.4 (realized if  the individual resides in  an 
institution), a rather small number that leaves less latitude in the choice of how 
far utility falls in nonoptimal housing states. 
Element (2, 1) of utility is set at 0.4 in the base case, a reduction of approxi- 
mately 43%  from the peak utility of 0.7 attainable in the health state of moder- 
ate disability. One can argue that this is too steep a reduction; hence in the 
simulations I have explored alternative values of this parameter, specifically 
0.5 (28% reduction), 0.6  (15% reduction), and 0.63 (10% reduction). 
Lifetime utility is the discounted sum of annual utilities, discounted at a rate 
of either .9 or .95 in the simulations.' 
In addition to accruing utility in each year of life, an elderly person gains 
utility upon death in the form of a bequest left to her heirs. Following Feinstein 
and Keating (1992), I assume that total lifetime utility is an additively separa- 
ble function of the sum of discounted annual utilities and a bequest function 
that takes the form 
I. This is in fact a rather large discount rate, meaning that in this model the elderly place a high 
value on the future. Note, however, that mortality risk is explicitly included in the model, so this 
reflects true discounting, with no correction for the risk of death. 286  Jonathan S. Feinstein 
where W is end-of-life wealth, ec are end-of-life health costs, and p and a  are 
parameters; the bequest is discounted at the same rate as annual utility. I as- 
sume that the elderly person possesses wealth W, at age 65; for the simulations 
I report in section 9.3, W, is set at $500,000, while in the later simulations of 
the model presented in section 9.4, W,  is chosen to be $250,000. In the model 
of this section, in which wealth plays only a small role, I assume that wealth 
then shrinks by a fixed proportion 8 each year the individual remains alive, an 
assumption that is meant to represent a very crude form of asset spend down, 
and I set 8 to 0.9. Following Scitovsky (1988), HC is set equal to $20,000, 
independent of age or sex.* Finally, fi is set equal to .00002 and (Y is set equal 
to 0.5; at these values, a bequest of $1,000,000 is worth approximately 4.5 
years of healthy life lived in conventional housing, and a bequest of $100,000 
is worth approximately 1.5 years of healthy life. 
9.2.3  Mobility Costs 
For the model developed in this section, I consider three kinds of mobility 
costs. The first kind is a temporary utility cost, whereby an individual’s utility 
in a particular year is lowered by  a fixed amount if  he has moved during the 
year or, in some specifications, if  he has moved during either the current or 
previous year. The second kind is a health cost, which increases the probability 
that an individual will either suffer a deterioration in health status or death in 
the year(s) following a move. Finally, the third kind of mobility cost is a separa- 
tion cost, meant to capture the emotional loss experienced when a person 
moves away from a home in which she has lived for a prolonged period. I apply 
the concept of separation cost by assuming that at age 65 an individual occu- 
pies a dwelling she has lived in for a long time, and that, upon her first move 
away from this home, she suffers a fixed utility loss that continues for all the 
remaining years of her life. 
Most of the evidence about these three kinds of mobility costs is anecdotal, 
and cannot be used to determine the specific magnitude of each  In the 
case of the temporary utility and separation costs, I have avoided choosing a 
single numerical value for the costs, preferring instead to simulate the model 
2. Scitovsky shows that end-of-life health costs vary only slightly with age and sex of  the de- 
ceased. 
3. Some interesting quantitative evidence on the direct, transient utility costs of  moving has 
been assembled by  Venti and Wise (1990), in the context of estimates of mobility based on the 
Retirement History Survey. They assume that the transaction costs of moving are proportionate  to 
utility (they assume a multiplicative, or log-linear, form for utility), and allow the magnitude of 
these costs to depend on initial health status. Venti and Wise then infer the magnitude of these 
costs by  estimating a model of mobility: as mobility is very low in their data, they infer a quite 
large value for transaction costs, as much as 50% of one-year utility: they also find that costs (as 
a proportion of utility) are larger when an individual is in worse health. However, Venti and Wise 
do not specify any sort of morbidity or mortality tables, and do not allow for the possibility that a 
move may affect morbidity or mortality. In addition, they do not explicitly posit a utility function 
that depends on both housing and health, and do not fit an optimizing dynamic model of the kind 
I develop in this paper. 287  Elderly Health, Housing, and Mobility 
over a relatively wide range of alternative values. The specification of health 
costs is more complex, however, and is less amenable to alternative parameter- 
izations; to capture some of the potential variability in these costs I have con- 
sidered both the case in which they last one year and the case in which they 
last two years. Below I describe my parameterization  of each of the three kinds 
of costs in greater detail. 
Consider first temporary utility costs of moving. I consider two distinct pat- 
terns for these costs. The flat cost pattern assumes that the utility cost is the 
same across all health states. For this pattern I simulate the model under the 
alternative  cost values 0,O. 1,0.2,0.3, and 0.4. Note that these five values cover 
a wide range; in particular, when the disutility of moving costs 0.4 units, the 
magnitude of the transaction cost is at lest 40%-its  value when an individual 
in poor health moves to conventional housing-and  as much as 100%-when 
an individual in poor health moves to institutional hou~ing.~  The other pattern 
assumes costs that are proportional to the utility of the best housing state avail- 
able to a person of given health status. These cost structures are 0.1 0.08 0.04, 
0.20.160.08,0.30.240.12, and0.40.320.16, where,foreachtriplet,thefirst 
number refers to the disutility suffered by a person in good health, the second 
to the disutility suffered by a moderately disabled person, and the third to the 
disutility suffered by someone in poor health. For both kinds of cost patterns, 
I consider separately and simulate separately models in which these direct util- 
ity costs last for one year (the year in which the move is made) or two years. 
The health costs associated with mobility possess a more complex structure 
than the corresponding  temporary utility and separation costs. In particular, the 
impact of  a move on an individual’s risk of  falling into worsened health or 
death is likely to depend upon the individual’s  age, sex, and initial health status. 
To formalize the relationship between mobility and health, I define a set of 
multipliers that multiply the baseline morbidity and mortality transition proba- 
bilities set forth in tables 9.1 and 9.2, leading to a new pair of tables, 9.4 and 
9.5, which apply to individuals who have moved. As the numbers in tables 9.4 
and 9.5 indicate, the effect of  the multipliers is to raise the probability of  a 
transition into worsened health and death, and to lower the probability of a 
transition to improved health. The multipliers vary in size; in general they are 
smaller the larger is the baseline probability they multiply, and are somewhat 
larger for persons whose initial health status is moderately disabled or poor, 
since the available evidence suggests that mobility is more deleterious for such 
persons. I determined the multipliers by  first choosing values for ages 65 and 
90, and then using a linear interpolation scheme and a small amount of smooth- 
ing to determine the value of  the multipliers that apply between these ages.5 
4. When the transaction cost is this high,  the results never exhibit a mobility pattern in  which a 
person in poor health moves to transitional housing, in which case total utility would have been 
negative. 
5. Subject to a monotonicity constraint that says that, for example, the  probability of death is 
nondecreasing with age. 288  Jonathan S. Feinstein 
Table 9.4  Probability of Transition from One Health  State to Another, by Age 
and Sex, Effect of Mobility-Modified  Case 
From Good Health to  From Moderately Disabled to  From Poor Health to 
Age  Good  Moderate  Poor  Good  Moderate  Poor  Good  Moderate  Poor 
A. Men 
65  ,8056 
66  .7911 
67  ,7749 
68  .7593 
69  ,7392 
70  ,7259 
71  .7110 
72  ,6963 
73  ,6821 
74  ,6686 
75  ,6583 
76  ,6476 
77  .6277 
78  .6047 
79  ,5773 
80  ,5520 
81  ,5264 
82  ,4978 
83  .4699 
84  ,4452 
85  .4096 
86  .3639 
87  .3272 
88  .3012 
89  ,2703 
90  .2370 
65  .8254 
66  .8116 
67  ,7975 
68  ,7931 
69  ,7701 
70  ,7534 
71  ,7427 
72  ,7302 
73  ,7123 
74  .6884 
75  .6678 
76  ,6490 
77  .6316 
78  .6084 
79  .5860 
80  ,5578 
81  ,5352 













































.0474  .0365 
.0468  .0364 
,0461  ,0364 
,0455  ,0364 
,0497  .0364 
.0532  ,0364 
.0558  ,0364 
.0549  .0364 
.0541  .0363 
.0568  .0363 
.0598  .0363 
.0635  .0360 
,0678  ,0333 
,0724  .0304 
,0771  ,0273 
,0828  ,0240 
,0894  ,0205 
.0974  .0168 
.lo76  ,0138 
,1176  .0106 
.1324  .0099 
.1473  .MI92 
.1622  .0092 
.1778  ,0092 
,1989  ,0092 














































,0500  ,8303 
,0468  .8176 
,0432  ,8028 
,0432  ,7845 
,0432  ,7549 
,0420  ,7424 
,0403  ,7462 
,0371  ,7420 
,0330  .7444 
.0286  ,7375 
.0245  ,7300 
.0216  .7227 
,0192  .7217 
,0167  .7111 
,0148  .6977 
,0128  ,6870 
,0107  .6855 
.0084  .6827 
.0988  .oooO 
,0972  .oooO 
.0956  .oooO 
.0940  .oooO 
,1053  .oooO 
,1104  .m 
,1141  .oooO 
,1121  .oooO 
.1101  .m 
,1113  .oooO 
,1208  .oooO 
,1277  .oooO 
,1357  .m 
,1445  .m 
,1471  .oooO 
,1541  .oooO 
,1622  .oooO 
.1682  .oooO 
.1680  .oooO 
.1653  .oooO 
.1734  .oooO 
.1809  .oooO 
.1863  .oooO 
,2022  .m 
.2248  .oooO 
.2355  .oooO 
,0988  .oooO 
,0972  .oooO 
,0956  .oooO 
.0940  .oooO 
.lo25  .oooO 
,1162  .oooO 
,1141  .oooO 
,1121  .oooO 
,1101  .oooO 
,1151  .oooO 
.1208  .oooO 
.1277  .oooO 
.1305  .OOOO 
.1358  .oooO 
.1410  .oooO 
.1442  .m 
.1479  .aooO 
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Table 9.4  (continued) 
From Good Health to  From Moderately Disabled to  From Poor Health to 



















































































Table 9.5  Probability of Death in the Next Year as a Function of Current 
















































































































Good  Moderately  Poor 








































































































,7680 290  Jonathan S.  Feinstein 
As an example of how the multipliers  were determined, consider males in good 
health. The multipliers chosen for age 65 multiply the probability of a transi- 
tion to moderate disability by 2.0 (raising it from .05 1 to .102), the probability 
of a transition to poor health by 3.0 (raised from .0158 to .0474), and the proba- 
bility of death by 3.0 (raised from .015 to .045);  the probability of remaining 
in good health in the transition from age 65 to 66 is then set to be the residual 
probability, one minus the sum of the other three revised transition probabili- 
ties. At age 90, the three multipliers fall in value to 1.5, 2.0,  and 2.0, so that 
the probability of a transition to moderate disability rises from .22 to .33, that 
for a transition to poor health rises from .1125 to .225, and that for death rises 
from .lo4 to .208. Between ages 65 and 90, a linear interpolation scheme 
smoothly adjusts each multiplier from its value at age 65 to its value at age 90, 
subject to the monotonicity requirement that each probability (other than that 
of remaining in good health) be nondecreasing with age. In the simulation, I 
consider both the case in which the mortality and morbidity costs of moving 
last only a single year, and the case in which these costs last two years. 
Finally, consider separation costs. This cost refers to the psychic disutility 
that an elderly person experiences when she is uprooted from a home she has 
lived in for an extended period. The tremendous pain that accompanies such a 
move is widely recognized in the gerontologic literature. For example, in No 
Place Like Home (1991), Danigelis and Fengler write: “Home has many at- 
tractions for the elderly homeowner. The sense of history and family tradition 
as expressed through memories and possessions; the feeling of familiarity and 
resulting security from a long tenancy in this residence; privacy, and above all 
the sense of mastery and control over environment all combine to make home 
an attractive place to live out one’s life” (9). They go on to cite a number of 
studies that have used surveys and interviews to verify the importance of at- 
tachment to home among the elderly. 
The separation cost can be modeled as follows. First, assume that at age 65 
the elderly person lives in the “family home.” If the elderly person leaves the 
home, he or she suffers a fixed disutility, which  persists  for an extendedperiod, 
as much as the rest of his or her life, in sharp contrast to the relatively brief 
costs associated with leaving more temporary abodes. Further, once the elderly 
person leaves the family home, this fixed cost begins, and it continues, regard- 
less of later mobility patterns. I specify the alternative values 0, 0.1, 0.2, and 
0.3 for this cost. 
9.2.4  Decisions and Method of Analysis 
In the model developed above, in each period the elderly person chooses 
whether to remain in his current residence, or to move to one of the two alterna- 
tive housing states available to him; if he does choose to move, he incurs any 
mobility costs included in the model. The individual’s  decision-making process 
must take into account not only the positive utility earned and possible mobil- 
ity costs incurred in the current period, but the impact of his decision on his 
future expected utility. To  model this decision-making procedure and deter- 291  Elderly Health, Housing, and Mobility 
mine the elderly person’s optimal choice, I employ standard dynamic program- 
ming techniques. 
Let i denote the individual’s current housing state, let j  denote his current 
health state, let k, and k, denote the two alternative housing states, and let h,, 
h,,  and h3 denote the three health states in the model. Further, define U(l;  s) to 
be current utility when an individual of health status r occupies housing state 
s,  let x(r)  denote the utility or separation costs of moving (which may or may 
not depend on health status r),  let qo(  I; z; t)  denote the baseline probability of 
a transition from health state r in period t to health state z in period t + 1,  and 
let qm(l;  z; t)  denote the probability of a transition from r to z when the individ- 
ual is experiencing a health cost related to moving. Finally, let V(l;  z; t)  denote 
the value function, defined below. 
Consider now the case in which the utility and health costs of moving last 
only one year, and there are no separation costs of moving. An individual who 
finds himself in health statej  and housing state i at the start of period t has the 
following total expected utility if he chooses not to move: 
r  1 
where 6 is the discount factor, B()  is the bequest function, defined earlier, and 
W,  and ec, are wealth and end-of-life costs in year t, also both defined earlier. 
If the individual moves to housing state k,, his total expected utility is 
The individual compares these expressions across his three options, choosing 
that option with highest total expected utility; this maximal expected utility is 
then denoted V(j,  i; t). 
To solve for the elderly person’s optimal decision each period, I have fol- 
lowed conventional methods and worked backward, beginning at age 90. For 
each year I have analyzed each possible combination of  health and housing 
states that an individual might possess at the beginning of  the period-nine 
total states in this model-and,  for each initial combination, have determined 
the optimal decision. 
For the most part, the procedure I have just outlined is quite straightforward. 
There is one subtlety, however, that arises whenever mobility costs last for two 
years. In that case one must distinguish two different value functions for each 
health and housing combination i and j:  one value function, denoted V,(i,  j;  t) 
refers to the value of being in states i andj  in t when one has moved in the 
previous period and must incur further mobility costs this period, regardless of 
whether or not one moves again; while the other, denoted V,(i,  j;  t),  refers to 
the value of being in states i and j in t and not having moved in the previous 
period. The above expressions for total expected utility then become 292  Jonathan S. Feinstein 
and 
U(j,  k,) -  x(j) + 6  c q,(j, z; t)V](Z,  k1;  t + 1) 
~~1.2.3 
+ 6  1 - c  q,(j, z; t)]B(W, -  ec,) 
in the case in which the elderly person did not move last period, with the opti- 
mal expected utility generating V,(  j,  i;  t); when the elderly person did move 
last period, the second expression remains the same, but the first becomes 
~(j,  i) -  x(j) + 6  C  q,(j, z; t)V,(z, i; t + 1) 
+ 6  1 - C  qm(j,  z; t)  B(W, -  ec,), 
[  z= 1.2.3 
1 
z=1.2,3 
[  z= 1.2.3 
and the optimal expected utility is denoted V,(j,  i;  t). 
The expressions for total expected utility are slightly different for the sepa- 
ration cost model. Consider this model for the case in which there are both 
separation costs and a one-year health cost of  moving. If  the individual has 
never left his age-65 home, his utility from remaining there is 
J 
where V,  refers to the value function when he resides in his age-65 home and 
has never moved in the past. If has never left his age-65 home but contemplates 
moving, his utility is 
U(j,  k,) -  x  + 6  C  q,(j, z; t>V,(z,  k,; t + 1) 
+ 6  1 - C  q,(j, z; t) B(W, -  ec,),  1 
z=1.2,3 
[  z=l,2,3 
where x  is the separation cost and  V,  refers to the value function if  he has 
moved. Finally, if he lives elsewhere than in his age-65 home, his utility is 
if he chooses not to move, and 
if he chooses to move. 293  Elderly Health, Housing, and Mobility 
9.3  Simulation Results for the First Model 
In this section I summarize the results of an extensive set of  simulations of 
the model presented in section 9.2. The most interesting aspect of this model 
is its predictions of  how mobility patterns and housing choices are likely to 
vary in response to variations in the magnitude of mobility costs. In order to 
properly gauge this response pattern, I have considered a wide range of mobil- 
ity cost parameters in the simulations. Further, since these mobility patterns 
and housing choices are my main interest, I focus most of my discussion on 
these issues, and say  very  little about either the calculation of  utility or the 
predicted value functions. 
In interpreting the simulation results, it is useful to define a benchmark 
against which to measure the extent of  mobility predicted by  any particular 
parameterization of  the model. For this purpose note that, according to the 
model, when all mobility costs are zero an elderly person will move each time 
she experiences a change in health status, generating what may conveniently 
be called the complete mobility pattern. In much of the discussion below, I will 
present results in terms of the ways in which a particular mobility pattern devi- 
ates from the complete mobility pattern. 
Figure 9.1 presents some descriptive results from simulating the model with 
no mobility costs. This figure, and all subsequent figures, forecasts the life 
history of an elderly person who enters the model at age 65 in good health and 
living in conventional housing. Figure 9. la  depicts the probability of a move, 
as a function of age; specifically, the panel shows, for both men and women, 
the conditional  probability, given that the individual  is alive in a particular year, 
that the individual will move, with the probability assessed based on a popula- 
tion that is in good health and conventional housing at age 65,  and that experi- 
ences health transitions according to the probabilities in  tables 9.1 and 9.2. 
Note that the probability of a move increases sharply with age. This increase 
is due to two factors: first, as individuals age, those in good health are more 
likely to experience a deterioration in health status; and second, at older ages 
a larger fraction of the population is likely to suffer from some degree of dis- 
ability, and therefore be relatively more likely than those in good health to 
experience a change in health status. In interpreting this and subsequent fig- 
ures, note that an individual may well move more than once; thus the predicted 
probability of  a move in later years is an average of  three terms, each term 
representing the product of the probability of residing in one of the three pos- 
sible housing states at the beginning of the year multiplied by the probability 
of a move, conditional on beginning the period in that housing state. The aver- 
age annual mobility rate implied by  the figure is 14%, well above the true 
mobility rate among the elderly, which is closer to 7%, according to figures 
presented in Feinstein and McFadden (1989). 
Figure 9.lb illustrates the probability that the elderly person will live in 
conventional, transitional, or institutional housing, again as a function of age 294  Jonathan S. Feinstein 
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Simulation results, first model, no mobility costs. a, mobility; 
and separately for men and women. Notice that the probability of  living in 
transitional housing rises sharply with age, reflecting the fact that most of those 
alive at later ages belong to the moderately disabled health category; the proba- 
bility of residing in an institution rises more slowly, increasing from approxi- 
mately 1% at younger ages to approximately 15% by age 90. 295  Elderly Health, Housing, and Mobility 
I first discuss the results of simulating models in which there is both a tem- 
porary utility cost of moving and a health cost, then go on to discuss results 
from models in which there is both a separation cost and a health cost, and 
conclude by examining the sensitivity of  some of  my results to variations in 
the off-diagonal utility element (2, I), a particularly crucial parameter that was 
mentioned earlier and that measures the extent to which utility falls when a 
moderately disabled person lives in conventional housing. 
Consider first the class of models in which there is both a temporary utility 
cost and a health cost of moving. Figure 9.2 provides some descriptive results 
for a particular model in this class, the one for which the utility cost of moving 
is set at 0.4 and lasts for two years, and the health cost also lasts for two years; 
this particular model contains the highest level of mobility costs of any I have 
examined in this class, and hence offers a particularly striking and informative 
comparison with the  zero-mobility-cost model discussed above, for which 
comparable results are depicted in figure 9.1. 
Figure 9.2a reveals that mobility is substantially lower in this case than in 
the zero-mobility-cost case. In particular, for both men and women mobility is 
comparable  to the zero-cost case at young ages, but does not rise smoothly with 
age; instead, for women mobility gradually falls, only to rise sharply during the 
last few years of life, while for men, after increasing for a few years, mobility 
plummets to zero (at age 72), then rapidly increases from zero at age 77, only 
to fall thereafter. Figure 9.2b depicts, for each age, the fraction of the popula- 
tion living in conventional, transitional, and institutional housing. As in figure 
9. lb, the proportion of individuals living in conventional housing falls with 
age, while the proportion living in transitional housing rises. The most signifi- 
cant difference between this graph and the corresponding graph in figure 9.1 
is that in this case the proportion of individuals  residing in institutional  housing 
is zero at all ages. 
A detailed examination of the simulation results produces the following ex- 
planations for these patterns. At younger ages, for both men and women, indi- 
viduals who fall into moderate disability always choose to move immediately 
into transitional housing. However, beginning at age 74, continuing until age 
78, and then beginning again at age 87, men who fall into moderate disability 
and live in conventional housing choose not to move; this fact explains both 
the deep trough in the male mobility pattern between ages 74 and 77 and the 
sharp spike at age 78 (due to a queue), as well as the decline in male mobility 
at later ages. At all ages individuals who fall into poor health choose not to 
move into an institution, and individuals who live in transitional housing and 
recover to good health choose not to move back into conventional housing; 
these facts explain why mobility is lower overall in this case than in the zero- 
cost case, and contributes toward an understanding of why mobility rates do 
not increase with age. Finally, for women mobility decreases between ages 85 
and 87 as those in moderate disability choose not to move into conventional 
housing, only to rise sharply during the last few years of life when moves into 
transitional housing resume. 296  Jonathan S. Feinstein 
Fig. 9.2  Simulation results, first model, mobility costs: two-year utility cost of 
0.4 plus two-year health cost. a, mobility; b, residence. 
Although results from models in which the utility cost and health costs of 
moving last only one year, or in which the utility cost if less than 0.4, differ in 
some respects from the model discussed above, the results from all models in 
this class share certain qualitative features. Overall, the simulation results for 
this class indicate that mobility is less common as mobility costs increase, as 297  Elderly Health, Housing, and Mobility 
expected. Nonetheless, the results also show that mobility costs must be quite 
substantial in order to significantly reduce mobility. To see this, consider again 
the model discussed at length above. In this model mobility is in fact consider- 
ably lower than in the zero-mobility-cost  model depicted in figure 9.1; in par- 
ticular, average mobility has fallen from approximately 14% a year to approxi- 
mately  5%, a value that is reasonably consistent with empirical evidence. 
However, this model incorporates very substantial mobility costs: the direct 
utility costs are 40% of the highest attainable one-year utility, are considerably 
more than 40% for those in worse health, and last over two years, while the 
indirect health costs last over two years and are, by any measure, steep. Appar- 
ently, mobility costs must be this high in order to produce realistic mobility 
patterns. 
Beyond the simple finding that mobility falls with increasing costs, the sim- 
ulation results suggest several other conclusions. One conclusion is that indi- 
viduals who fall into poor health often are unwilling to bear the relatively high 
transaction costs of  moving (relative to utility) to an institution, and often 
choose to remain in current housing. Interestingly, the results suggest that indi- 
viduals who fall into poor health are most likely to move at more advanced 
ages, presumably in part because they are then less likely to experience an 
improvement in health in the future, and therefore can expect to benefit less 
from staying where they are. A second conclusion is that persons whose health 
improves from moderately disabled or poor to good are often unwilling to 
move back into conventional housing, especially at advanced ages, presumably 
because they are likely to lapse back into poor health in the near future. Thus 
reverse flows are discouraged by mobility costs. A third result is that, for many 
sets of simulations, transaction costs affect mobility more at older ages than at 
younger ages, in the sense that mobility patterns vary more with variations in 
transaction costs at these ages (this result is well illustrated by a comparison 
of figures 9.la and 9.2a). 
Perhaps the most striking mobility pattern concerns individuals  who fall into 
the health category moderately disabled. Throughout nearly all of the simula- 
tion results such individuals, whether they were previously in good or poor 
health, choose to move  (immediately) into transitional housing upon falling 
into moderate disability. In contrast, in models for which the transaction costs 
of moving are high, individuals do not always move into institutional housing 
if they fall into poor health, and do not always move back into conventional 
housing if  their health improves from poor or moderately disabled to good. 
The combination of these two patterns results, in many circumstances,  in tran- 
sitional housing being a predeath absorbing state: once an individual moves 
into this kind of  housing, he or she may  never leave, even when his or her 
health status changes. 
The fact that individuals move into transitional housing so often has several 
important implications. First, this finding highlights the importance of includ- 
ing such a housing state in empirical models of aging and housing choice- 
reducing housing to the two states “conventional” and “institutional“  precludes 298  Jonathan S. Feinstein 
exactly those mobility patterns that economic theory, as developed in this pa- 
per, predicts will occur most frequently in an elderly population. Second, from 
the viewpoint of elderly housing policy, this finding suggests that transitional 
housing could play an important role in improving elderly well-being, particu- 
larly in a world in which mobility is costly. 
On examination,  the finding that individuals choose to move into transitional 
housing so readily can be explained as due in part to the fact that in this inter- 
mediate housing state the elderly can choose not to move again should their 
health either deteriorate further or improve, without suffering a huge disutility 
as a consequence (support for this hypothesis comes from the fact that the 
elderly do not always move when they fall into poor health or when their health 
improves from moderately disabled to good). This rationale would not be un- 
covered by static or nonoptimizing models, but is highlighted by the dynamic 
programming approach taken in this paper. 
It is interesting to note that, according to the simulation results, the move- 
ment into an institution tends to be reduced relatively more by mobility costs 
than does the movement into transitional housing. Specifically, the results sug- 
gest that it is often the case that an individual will move into transitional hous- 
ing upon a deterioration from good to moderately disabled health, and then 
choose not to move into an institution when his health deteriorates further to 
poor; whereas the opposite mobility pattern, in which the individual chooses 
not to move from conventional into transitional housing when his health first 
deteriorates from good to moderately disabled, but then moves directly from 
conventional housing into an institution when his health deteriorates further to 
poor, is never observed. 
With one exception, it is never the case that an individual who chooses to 
move decides not to move into the housing state that matches his current health 
status. This one exception occurs when a person who was previously in poor 
health recovers to good health (this transition has probability zero in the simu- 
lations and therefore is not directly relevant; but the mobility pattern described 
still has inherent interest). In this situation, and for certain parameter values, 
the person moves into transitional housing, a result that again highlights the 
importance of the dynamic programming approach (since this would never oc- 
cur in a one-period static model). 
Now consider the class of models in which there is both a permanent separa- 
tion cost incurred when an individual leaves his “family home” (his home as 
of  age 65), as well as a one-year health cost incurred following all moves. 
Figure 9.3 describes the model in this class for which the separation cost is 
0.2. Figure 9.3a shows that for both men and women there is no mobility until 
age 71, at which age there is a very large mobility spike, followed by an ini- 
tially steep and progressively more gradual decline in mobility at later ages. 
This mobility pattern is not difficult to understand, in the light of the nature of 
the mobility costs individuals face. Young elderly are unwilling to leave their 
age-65 home, since doing so results in a permanent cost. Eventually, in this 
case at age 71, the benefits of moving outweigh the costs for those in moderate 299  Elderly Health, Housing, and Mobility 
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Fig. 9.3  Simulation results, first model, mobility costs: sepration cost of 0.2 
plus one-year health cost. a, mobility; b, residence. 
disability or poor health, and the large number in these health states do move- 
hence the spike at this age. In subsequent years the elderly continue to move 
from conventional housing into transitional housing when their health deterio- 
rates from good to moderately disabled; but since fewer and fewer persons live 
in conventional housing and possess good health, this flow contributes less to 300  Jonathan S.  Feinstein 
overall mobility. Meanwhile, at all ages individuals who fall into poor health 
choose not to move into an institution. Together, these two phenomena explain 
the gradual decline in mobility at older ages. Figure 9.3b depicts the fraction 
of residents in each of the three housing states, at each age, and is fully consis- 
tent with the discussion above. 
The fact that the separation-cost  model predicts a somewhat different mobil- 
ity pattern than the temporary-utility-cost  model suggests that the relative im- 
portance empirically of these two kinds of mobility-cost models could perhaps 
be determined with appropriate data. 
One striking qualitative feature shared by  nearly all the results reviewed 
above is the finding that individuals who fall into moderately disabled health 
often move into transitional housing. While this result holds true both for indi- 
viduals previously in poor health and institutionalized as well as for individu- 
als previously in good health and living in conventional housing, it is far more 
common for an elderly person to deteriorate from good health to moderate 
disability than to recover from poor health to moderate disability. Since the 
sequence of events in which an elderly person deteriorates from good to mod- 
erately disabled health is so common, and the simulation results predict that 
the move into transitional housing that accompanies this health transition is 
relatively likely, this particular mobility decision seems worthy of further in- 
vestigation; in particular, we may ask how variations in the utility benefits of 
occupying transitional housing (as opposed to conventional housing) affect the 
willingness of elderly people to move in this situation. 
Recall that the utility parameterization sets the utility associated with mod- 
erate disability and transitional housing to 0.7, and the utility associated with 
moderate disability and conventional housing to 0.4. I have  explored how 
an increase in this second parameter affects the willingness of elderly per- 
sons to move when they fall into moderate disability. I note that, whenever this 
parameter is small enough that a moderately disabled person living in conven- 
tional housing always wishes to move, the parameter has no impact (that is, 
within this range varying this parameter has no effect on the model’s solution). 
I have found that when the parameter is raised to 0.5, the elderly continue to 
move in this health state. 
When the parameter is raised to 0.6, at which point the disutility associated 
with remaining in conventional housing is approximately 15% (from the level 
of  0.7 achieved when  the  elderly person  moves  to  transitional housing), 
whether or not the elderly move depends on the transaction costs of moving. 
In particular, when the health cost of moving lasts one year and the utility cost 
is at or below 0.1 and lasts for one year, individuals always move; when the 
utility cost is between 0.1 and 0.2, individuals sometimes do and sometimes 
do not move, depending on their age and sex; and when the cost is 0.25 and 
above, no one moves. 
Now consider what happens when the off-diagonal utility element is raised 
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tional housing is only 10%.  Again, assume health costs of moving that last one 
year. When the utility cost of  moving is zero, mobility is still not assured: 
among men, a move takes place only for those 81 or older; among women, a 
move is made for those aged 65 to 69, and 71 on. When the utility cost is raised 
to 0.07 for one year, itself 10% of the maximal utility in the moderately disa- 
bled health state, mobility falls further: men never move; women move begin- 
ning at age 74. When the utility cost is raised to 0.1, women move only be- 
tween ages 78 and 83 (men never move); finally, when the cost is 0.15 and 
above, no one ever moves in this situation. 
I conclude that, if the disutility of “mismatched” housing is 15% or more, 
then even when there are substantial costs associated with moving (one-year 
health costs plus moderate utility costs), the elderly will, according to the 
model, move into transitional housing. 
9.4  Second Model 
In this section I extend the model developed in section 9.2 to include a role 
for housing prices, a financial transaction cost on the sale of a home, interest 
rates, mortgage rates, annuity income, and an explicit consumption decision 
made each period jointly with the housing decision already described. 
The most important extension of the first model modifies the definition of 
utility to include consumption, and computes the elderly individual’s optimal 
consumption choice each period jointly with her housing decision. Recall that 
in the first model utility depends primarily on the quality of the match between 
housing and health, according to the function U(j,  i),  where j is the individual’s 
health state and i her housing state. The new utility function specifies utility to 
be equal to log[c(t)]U(j,  i),  where c(t)  is consumption in period t,  measured 
in dollars spent. When the individual moves and incurs utility or separation 
costs x, utility is defined to be log[c(t)][U(j, i) -  XI.  Note that according to 
this specification the marginal utility of consumption depends on both health 
status and the match between housing and health. Thus the marginal utility is 
highest for an individual in good health residing in conventional housing, and 
lower for individuals in worse health, or living in ill-suited housing. When 
there are utility costs of moving, the marginal utility of consumption also falls 
following a move. In contrast to the logarithmic form for consumption, I have 
also explored the implications of using an alternative linear specification, in 
which utility is equal to c(t)[U(j,  i)];  in section 9.5 I briefly discuss the results 
of simulating models based on this alternative specification. 
I modify the bequest function so as to preserve the value of  the bequest 
relative to the utility associated with a year of healthy life. In particular, I multi- 
ply the earlier function by seven, so that the bequest is now defined to be 
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Comparing the modified bequest function to the modified utility function re- 
veals that a $1 million bequest is now worth approximately three years of good 
health to an individual living in a conventional home and spending approxi- 
mately $20,000 annually on consumption. 
Total utility continues to be equal to the expected value of the sum of the 
discounted annual utilities plus the discounted value of the bequest. 
Consider now the modifications introduced by including housing prices in 
the model. Denote these prices as p,(t),  p2(t),  and p,(t),  where p,(t)  and p,(t) 
refer to the price of, respectively, a conventional and a transitional home in 
year r, and p3(  t)  refers to the cost charged for spending year t in an institution. 
For the simulations  I setp,(65) equal to $200,000, somewhat above the median 
price for a detached single-family dwelling in the United States, p2(65)  equal 
to $150,000, on the supposition that transitional housing, of which prime ex- 
amples are retirement condominiums and townhomes, will typically be some- 
what smaller and less expensive than conventional housing, and p,(65) equal 
to $25,000, which is approximately the average cost of  one year in a private 
nursing home facility in the United States at the present time. Then I define 
p,(t) =  p,(65)(1 +  IT,)^-^^, where the nj  are rates of appreciation (or deprecia- 
tion) for the three kinds of housing. 
To determine explicit values for the ni,  I turn to several recent publications. 
Mankiw and Weil (1989) and Poterba (1991) discuss possible rates of  real 
appreciation (or depreciation) for conventional homes over the next several 
decades, and argue that homes will either appreciate a small amount or depre- 
ciate. Based on their discussion, I set n1  equal to .01, reflecting a 1% annual 
real appreciation. Elderly housing prices are likely to fare at least as well as 
conventional housing prices in the decades ahead, as the number of elderly 
grows; hence I also set n2  equal to .01. To  explore the sensitivity of my results 
to alternative rates of appreciation and depreciation, I have run a number of 
additional simulations, discussed in the next section, in which I experiment 
with smaller values for IT,  and larger values for n2.  Based on evidence pre- 
sented by Maple, Donham, and Cowan (1992), I assume that the price of one 
year in an institution will rise at a real rate of 2% per year, so that IT,  = .02. In 
a number of additional simulations I assume, as an alternative, that T,  = .04, 
reflecting a 4% annual rate of increase in the price of institutional care. I have 
not incorporated price uncertainty into the model, for reasons of computa- 
tional complexity. 
The calculation of  household wealth is considerably more complicated in 
the new, extended model than in the original model. I will therefore describe 
this calculation in some detail, first defining a number of key variables, and 
then outlining the steps required to compute wealth in each period, for each 
possible housing state. 
Define r to be the real rate of interest earned on savings, and define r, to be 
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whose value exceeds their current wealth$ in the simulations I assume that r 
equals .02 and rm  equals .04. Next defineA(t) to be the amount of real annuity 
income an individual earns at the start of each period in which he is alive; I 
assume that A(t) = A,(1  + r)I-65,  where A,  is the value of the annuity at age 
65, set to $18,000 in the simulations. In keeping with the earlier model, define 
W,  to be total wealth as of age 65, and define W,  to be total wealth in year t. 
For the simulations I assume that W, equals $250,000, of which $200,000 is 
equity in the elderly person’s home (which is assumed to be a conventional 
home on which no debt is owed), and the remainder is savings; these numbers 
are consistent with the findings of Feinstein and McFadden (1989), Venti and 
Wise (1990), and Ai et al. (1990) that the vast majority of all elderly wealth 
resides in homeownership. Finally, I assume that there is a financial transaction 
cost incurred whenever an elderly person sells a home of either the conven- 
tional or transitional type, assessed at 6% of the value of the home at the time 
of the sale. 
Suppose now  that household wealth is  W, at the beginning of year t.  To 
calculate W,,,,  household wealth at the beginning of the following year, it is 
useful to distinguish the case in which the elderly person lives in conventional 
or transitional housing from the case in which she lives in an institution. Sup- 
pose first that the household lives in either conventional or transitional housing 
at the start of year t, denoted in what follows as housing state i. Two cases then 
arise: either total wealth exceeds the value of  the home, in which case the 
household has additional savings; or total wealth falls short of the value of the 
home, in which case the household has a mortgage. If the household does not 
move in year t,  then, in the first case, its wealth at the start of  year t + 1 is 
equal to 
p,(t  + 1) + (W, -  p,(t)  + A(t) -  c(t))(l  + r), 
where it is implicitly assumed that c(t)  is chosen to be less than W, + A(t) - 
p,(t),  disposable in~ome.~  In the second case, defining y  = (p,(t) -  W(t))/ 
(p,(t))  to be the fraction of  the home not owned by  the household (so that 
1 -  y is the fraction that is owned), household wealth is 
(1 -  Yk,(t  + 1) -  YP,(t>rm  + (A@) -  c(t))(l + r) 
(1 -  y)p$  + 1) -  YP,(t>rm  -  (c(t)  -  A(t))(l + rm) 
if the household consumes less than its annuity income, and 
6. In the  simulations I impose the restriction that a household is not allowed to move into a 
house if its total wealth falls below 25%  of the house’s price, an assumption that serves to eliminate 
the possibility of a household increasing its debt to very high levels, and is consistent with most 
mortgage-lending rules. 
7. This and the other implicit assumptions made in the following few paragraphs are all part of 
all the optimal solutions found via the computer simulations. 304  Jonathan S. Feinstein 
if the household consumes more than its annuity income, where the first term 
refers to the percentage of capital gains captured by the household, the second 
to the mortgage payment, and the third to either the net savings or net debt 
created by  the difference between annuity income and consumption.*  If the 
household does move in year t, the calculation is similar, but slightly more 
complex. If the household moves to either conventional or transitional housing, 
denoted housing state k in what follows, it pays a transaction cost d equal to 
the value of the home being sold, so that d = .06pi(t).  Thus total proceeds for 
the sale of  the home are S = (1 -  y)p,(t) -  d, where y = 0 if there is no 
mortgage on the initial home (it is implicitly assumed that S is positive). Now 
let W denote the household’s total wealth immediately following sale of the 
home; W is equal to S + A(t) + W, -  p,(t)  if the household’s initial wealth 
exceeded p,(t),  and S + A(t)  if  not. Again, we must distinguish the case in 
which the household’s total wealth W exceeds the price pk(t)  of the new home 
from the case in which it does not. When W does exceed the purchase price, 
the household’s wealth in year t + 1, W,,,, is given by 
P,(t + 1) + (W -  p,(t) -  c(t))(l  + I), 
while, when W falls short of the purchase price, W,,, is given by 
If the elderly person moves into an institution, the calculation of  L?  above is 
identical. If  W exceeds p,( t),  the price of institutional care, household wealth 
in year t + 1 is simply calculated to be 
where c(t)  is constrained to be no more than @ -  p,(t).  If  kfJ falls short of 
p,(t),  then c(t)  is set equal to zero (in the simulations, set to a very small finite 
value) and W,,, is also set equal to zero. 
Finally, let us consider the case in which the elderly person lives in an insti- 
tution at the start of year t. I assume that an individual, for whom the sum of 
his wealth plus annuity income falls short of the price of  institutional care, 
remains in the institution as a ward of the state, an assumption that is consistent 
with spend-down rules prevalent in most states. In this situation c(t)  is set to 
zero, wealth in year t + 1  is also zero, and the individual is not allowed to 
move. If the individual’s wealth exceeds the cost of institutional care, then, if 
she chooses not to move, her wealth at the start of year t + 1 is given by  the 
maximum of zero and 
(W, -  P,(t) +  -  c(t))(l + r), 
8. I am assuming that the household cannot refinance its mortgage, and that it simply pays the 
interest due on its loan, based on the home’s current price, rmyp,(r),  each period. 305  Elderly Health, Housing, and Mobility 
where c(t)  is constrained to be no larger than W, -  p3(t)  + A(t).  If she moves 
to housing state k, then, if her total wealth, W, +  A(t),  exceeds the cost of the 
home, her wealth in t + 1 is given by 
p,(t + 1) + (W,  + A(t) -  p,(t) -  c(t))(l + r), 
p,(t + 1) -  (c(t)  -  W, - 
if c(t)  < W, + A(t) -  p,(t),  and 
+  P,(t))(l  +  rm)7 
if c(t)  > W, +  A(t) -  p,(t),  while if her wealth is less than the cost of the new 
home her wealth is given by 
To  conclude my discussion of the model of this section, I will outline how 
the method used to analyze the earlier model must be extended to compute 
individuals’ optimal consumption and housing decisions in the revised model. 
As for the earlier model, let i denote the individual’s current housing state, 
let j  denote his current health state, let k, and k, denote the two alternative 
housing states, and let h,, h,,  and h, denote the three health states in the model. 
In the revised model the value function Vdepends not only on health and hous- 
ing, but also on wealth, and is denoted V(W  I; z;  t),  where Wis the household’s 
wealth at the start of period t. 
In the extended model the individual chooses both where to live and the 
level of consumption in each period. To determine the optimal housing choice 
and level of consumption, it is convenient to break the problem into two steps. 
In the first step each housing alternative is considered in turn, and for each 
alternative the optimal level of consumption is computed, assuming that alter- 
native were to be chosen. Thus we define three interim value functions, one for 
each housing alternative, as follows: 
Ri  = max log[c(t)lU(j,  i) + 6  c qo(j,  z; t)V(W,+,,  z, i;  t + 1) 
4’1.2.3 
where 1 = 1,2;  W,,,  is wealth at the start of period t + 1, which depends upon 
c(t)  and must be computed separately (and in general will be different) for 
each of  the three housing states according to the procedure described above; 
and x is the utility cost of moving, as before. In the second step a comparison 
is made among the three values Rj,  R,,, and Rk2,  and the largest of these three 306  Jonathan S. Feinstein 
is chosen; consumption is then equal to the value that was found to maximize 
the above expression for the appropriate R function. 
The extension of this calculation to the case in which mobility costs last 
more than  one year, and to the case in which there is a separation cost, is 
straightforward and is not presented here. 
9.5  Simulation Results for the Second Model 
In this section I present results obtained from simulating several different 
versions of the extended model of  elderly housing and consumption.  I  first 
present results for a version of the model in which there are no mobility costs 
apart from a financial transaction cost. Then I turn to results for specifications 
of  the model in which there are mobility costs, beginning  with a model in 
which there are both temporary utility costs and health costs, and then dis- 
cussing a specification in which there are both permanent separation costs and 
health costs. Finally, I explore the sensitivity of my findings to modifications 
in my parameterizations of the bequest function, the utility function, and the 
rate of appreciation of future housing prices. Throughout, I contrast the results 
for the extended model to the comparable results for the simpler model of 
elderly housing decisions analyzed in section 9.3. 
As my detailed review of the results will show, the results for the extended 
model tend to corroborate the earlier findings for the first, simpler model of 
mobility. In particular, mobility is significantly affected by mobility costs, the 
pattern of mobility (with age) is different depending on whether there are tem- 
porary utility costs or a permanent separation cost of moving, and transitional 
housing emerges as an important modeling construct, housing a large propor- 
tion of the population, especially at older ages, and, in some versions of the 
model, serving as a predeath absorbing state. 
Figure 9.4 presents a set of simulation results for the version of the extended 
model in which the only mobility cost is the 6% financial charge on the sale 
of a conventional or transitional home. In this figure, and figures 9.5 and 9.6, 
the graphs refer to the projected experience of an elderly person, who as of 
age 65 is in good health, lives in a conventional home that he or she owns and 
that is worth $200,000, and possesses an additional $50,000 in liquid assets. 
Figure 9.4a depicts the average probability of a move, at each age, separately 
for men and women. For both sexes mobility is approximately 6% at age 65, 
rises steadily to its peak in the early 80s, at which point it is 15% for women 
and  17% for men, and then falls sharply. Figure 9.4b depicts the fraction of 
individuals living in conventional, transitional, and institutional housing, again 
as a function of age. As expected, the fraction living in conventional housing 
falls steadily over time, from near  100% to near 0%, the fraction living in 
transitional housing rises steadily, from near 0% to near loo%, and the fraction 
living in institutions rises slowly, from near 0% at age 65 to slightly less than 
10% in the late 80s (before falling at age 90). Finally, figure 9.4~  depicts the 307  Elderly Health, Housing, and Mobility 
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average ratio of consumption to wealth among those living at each age, again 
separately for men and women. According to the graph, for both men  and 
women the proportion of  wealth consumed is near 12% at age 65, and falls 
slowly with age, to approximately 6% at age 90; women exhibit slightly larger 
consumption ratios than men at younger ages, and ratios essentially identical 
to those of men at older ages. 
Figures 9.4a and b are directly comparable to figures 9.la and b,  which 
depict the corresponding graphs for the zero-mobility-cost  specification of the 
first model of elderly housing, considered in  sections 9.2 and 9.3. The only 
substantial difference between the two models is that in the earlier model mo- 
bility rises monotonically  with age, whereas in the model of this section mobil- 
ity first rises, but then falls at very old ages. 
To gain greater insight into the shapes of the graphs depicted in figure 9.4, 
consider several facts that emerge from a detailed examination of the simula- 
tion results for the model. First, as in the earlier zero-mobility-cost model, 
the elderly nearly always move into their optimal housing state immediately 
following a change in health status. Thus the financial transaction cost does 
not by itself discourage mobility; further, the elderly do not choose to move 
out of conventional housing in order to invest more of their assets in savings, 
so as to em  a higher rate of return (2% versus 1% on housing) on their wealth. 
The one situation in which the elderly do not always choose to move into their 
preferred housing state is when they possess very low wealth; in this case they 
often choose not to move and, when they do move, at times follow what may 
be called a “bankruptcy” strategy in which they intentionally move to an insti- 
tution, exhaust all of their wealth, and become a ward of the state. 
A second set of facts concerns the consumption decisions of the elderly. At 
most ages and for most housing and health states, consumption is only slightly 
more than annuity income. The primary reason consumption is maintained at 
this modest level is to protect the size of the bequest, which exerts a substantial 
impact on total utility. In fact, the importance of the bequest helps explain why 
the ratio of consumption to wealth falls at very old ages: at these ages death is 
imminent (recall that in the model all individuals die by age 91), and individu- 
als would rather hoard their wealth for the bequest than spend it on consump- 
tion. A contributing factor in this explanation is that many individuals suffer 
from either moderate disabilities or poor health at these older ages, and there- 
fore benefit less from consumption (recall that utility is the log of consumption 
multiplied by  a function that depends on health and housing). A last reason 
why consumption is maintained at modest levels is to hoard resources that may 
be needed either to pay the financial transaction cost associated with selling a 
conventional or transitional home, or to pay the cost of institutional care. 
The simulation results also provide information about the relationship be- 
tween wealth, mobility, and housing. Consider the results for men. At age 68, 
average wealth among the living is $229,000, $21,000 below wealth at age 65. 
At this age, among those who move average wealth is $227,000, among those 309  Elderly Health, Housing, and Mobility 
living in conventional housing average wealth is $229,000, and among those 
living in transitional housing average wealth is $234,000. At age 80, average 
wealth has fallen slightly to $213,000. At age 80, average wealth is $209,000 
among those who move, $207,000 among those living in conventional housing, 
and $217,000 among those living in transitional housing. Note that average 
wealth is highest for those living in transitional housing; at least in part this 
result is due to the fact that for these individuals the marginal utility of con- 
sumption is lower than for those in (good health and living in) conventional 
housing. Results are similar for women and are not reported here. 
Now consider a version of the extended model in which there are both two- 
year temporary utility costs of moving and two-year health costs, in addition 
to the financial transaction costs. I assess the health costs at the same level as 
in the earlier models. When the utility costs are set at a value of 0.4, compara- 
ble to those used to generate the results presented in figure 9.2 and discussed 
at length in section 9.3, the simulation results indicate that there is no mobility. 
Apparently, the combination of substantial health, financial, and utility costs is 
sufficient to discourage all mobility. When the utility costs are reduced to 0.2, 
there is mobility, and it is this specification that I will discuss in detail. 
Figure 9.5 presents results from the simulation of the model with two-year 
utility costs of  moving set at the value 0.2  (plus two-year health costs and 
financial costs of moving). Interestingly, the mobility pattern predicted by this 
model, shown in figure 9Sa, is very close to that predicted by the correspond- 
ing earlier model with utility costs of 0.4, depicted in figure 9.2a. In both mod- 
els the mobility of men is approximately 6% from age 65 to early 70s, then 
plunges to zero, soars to a height of 25% for a single year, then falls sharply 
back to under 10% the next year, followed by  a gradual descent, and then a 
sharp increase at age 90. Clearly, this complex pattern is not an artifact induced 
by  a peculiarity of  specification, but is robust to alternative modeling struc- 
tures. For women, mobility is much smoother over time, remaining at approxi- 
mately 6% from age 65 to age 80, and then falling smoothly, rising sharply at 
age 90. Figure 9.5b illustrates the fraction of individuals residing in conven- 
tional, transitional, and institutional housing, as a function of  age, and is again 
very similar to figure 9.2b. Finally, figure 9.5~  depicts the average ratio of con- 
sumption to wealth, separately for men and women, as a function of age. As in 
figure 9.4~  the ratio falls with age, and the ratio is somewhat higher for women, 
especially at younger ages. 
A detailed examination of the simulation shows that the only move that the 
elderly consistently make is from conventional housing to transitional  housing, 
undertaken when their health deteriorates from good to moderately disabled. 
They never move into an institution, except occasionally at very low wealth 
levels when they adopt the bankruptcy strategy alluded to earlier. Further, they 
never move back from transitional housing to conventional housing when their 
health improves. Thus, as in the earlier models with mobility costs, transitional 
housing turns out to be a predeath absorbing state. The conclusion is that the 310  Jonathan S. Feinstein 
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basic importance of transitional housing is preserved when the original model 
is extended to include a far richer specification of economic variables and deci- 
sions. 
The finding that the ratio of  consumption to wealth is slightly higher for 
women than for men, true in both of the two models just considered, seems to 
be due to the fact that men are relatively more likely to die, and therefore more 
likely to leave a bequest in the near future. Since the value of the bequest is 
quite high and, in particular, the marginal value of additional dollars preserved 
for the bequest is high relative to the marginal value of extra dollars of con- 
sumption (evaluated at the relevant baseline values indicated by  the simula- 
tions), men have greater incentive to hoard their ~ealth.~ 
The extended model with separation and health costs of moving is depicted 
in figure 9.6; for this figure, the model was simulated with a separation cost of 
0.2 and a one-year health cost of moving, the same specification used to gener- 
ate the comparable results for the earlier model for which results are depicted 
in figure 9.3. As figure 9.6a shows, men do not move at all until past age 80; 
they then experience a sharp spike in mobility, which lasts for several years 
and is due to the unleashing of mobility among those in mismatched housing, 
followed by  a decline to modest mobility levels in the last years of life. For 
women, mobility first begins at age 77, is followed by a very sharp one-year 
spike in mobility, and then gradually declines to modest levels. These mobility 
patterns are quite similar to those depicted in figure 9.3a, except that mobility 
begins at later ages in the model depicted in figure 9.6. Figure 9.6b depicts the 
fraction of individuals living in the various housing states, and is again quite 
similar to figure 9.3b. Finally, figure 9.6~  denotes the average ratio of consump- 
tion to wealth; as with the earlier graphs of this ratio in figures 9.4 and 9.5, the 
ratio falls smoothly with age, in this case beginning just above 12% and falling 
to approximately 6%,  with the ratio higher for women than for men at all ages. 
9.6  Concluding Comments 
The analysis of  elderly mobility presented in this paper has generated a 
number of  interesting insights. Most importantly, I have found that the eco- 
nomic model of mobility can predict realistic levels of mobility, when enriched 
to include a variety of  mobility costs. In addition, my  analysis indicates the 
importance of transitional housing, which is predicted to become an absorbing 
state for the elderly in many situations. 
I  believe the analysis could be  fruitfully extended in  several directions. 
9. A simple calculation shows that the marginal utility associated with an additional $1.000 
invested in the bequest, when its baseline value is $200,000, is nearly ten times higher than the 
marginal utility associated with consuming the extra $1,000, when the baseline level of  consump- 
tion is $20,000. In part this difference is due to the absolute worth of the bequest; but it is also 
due to the fact that the bequest is a square-root function, whereas consumption is logarithmic, and 
hence relatively flatter at high dollar values. 312  Jonathan S. Feinstein 
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Rather than specifying only three housing states, it would be more realistic to 
consider a larger number. One way to do this would be to define a bundle of 
housing attributes, including architectural design variables, location variables, 
and health services variables. Then each particular bundle of attributes might 
be considered to be a viable housing alternative. If prices were attached to each 
attribute (or small bundle of  attributes), such a model would fit naturally into 
the framework developed in section 9.4. 
A second important extension would incorporate uncertainty over future 
housing prices. Finally, a third extension would refine the definition of health 
states, perhaps by considering several “representative” patterns of aging. For 
each such pattern, a specific health transition matrix could be specified. In 
addition, each pattern could be associated with its own health-housing match- 
ing utility function, based on the relationship between the health scenario and 
specific housing attributes. 
Appendix 
In this appendix I describe the sources used and steps taken to construct tables 
9.1 and 9.2. The two primary sources for these tables are Manton (1988) and 
Feinstein and Keating (1992). In table 4 of his 1988 paper Manton presents 
estimates of two-year transition probabilities based on data from the 1982 and 
1984 National Long-Term Care Survey. Manton considers the following 1982 
groups: no disability; IADL only; 1 to 2 ADLs, 3 to 4 ADLs; 5 to 6 ADLs; and 
institutionalized (there are also nonrespondents). Since I  am  specifying a 
model with only three health states, I have combined certain of Manton’s cate- 
gories; in particular, I have considered Manton’s first group, “not disabled,” to 
be equivalent to my category “good health”; his categories “IADLs,” “1 to 2 
ADLs,” “3 to 4 ADLs,” and “5 to 6 ADLs,” summed, to be equivalent to my 
category “moderately disabled health”; and his “institutionalized”  category to 
be equivalent to my  category of  the same name. For the 1984 data Manton 
forms the same categories, plus one additional category, “deceased” (again, 
there is a small problem with nonrespondents). 
I have needed to make two main modifications to Manton’s data. First, his 
data refers to transitions over a two-year period, whereas I require one-year 
transition probabilities. Second, his numbers clearly sharply understate the 
probability that an individual will be admitted to an institution at some point 
between 1982 and  1984, since it records institutionalization only at a single 
1984 date; related to this is the fact that his numbers greatly overstate the prob- 
ability of death when in “good” or “moderately disabled” health, since they do 
not capture a common sequence in which an elderly person enters an institu- 
tion for a short stay before dying. To resolve these two issues I have drawn on 
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I use Manton’s numbers, unmodified, to compute 
Probability(good  health in t + 1 I  moderately disabled in t) 
and 
Probability(moderate1y  disabled health in t + 1 I good health in t) 
separately for men and women, for each of the five-year age averages Manton 
reports (65-69,70-74,75-79,  80-84,85-).  I also impose the assumption that 
Probability(good health in t + 1 I poor health in t)  = 0 
for all ages for both men and women. I use Feinstein and Keating, table 1, 
directly for 
Probability(  poor health in t + 1 I good health in t) 
(this probability is assumed to be equivalent to the probability of nursing home 
entry as reported in that table; in that sense, it is probably something of an 
underestimate). I also rely on certain multipliers reported in  Feinstein and 
Keating to set 
Probability(  poor health in r + 1  1 moderately disabled health in t). 
For younger ages I set this value to 2.5 times the probability assessed for those 
in  good health in year t; at older ages I reduce this figure to  1.5 times the 
probability assessed for those in good health in year t. 
I use table 4 of Feinstein and Keating (based on data from the National 
Nursing Home Survey), which reports detailed statistics  on nursing home dura- 
tion and discharge status, to determine 
Probability(moderate1y  disabled health in t + 1 I poor health in t). 
Note that, whereas Feinstein and Keating present a discrete hazard model in 
which length of stay varies from as little as fourteen days to as much as seven 
years, for the purposes of this paper I have simplified their numbers to a simple 
one-year probability; the probability that a person continues in poor health in 
r + 1, denoted 
Probability(  poor health in t + 1 I poor health in t), 
is taken from their numbers. But in the construction I am using in this paper, 
nursing home duration is assumed to follow a Markov process; empirical re- 
sults reported by  Garber and MaCurdy (1989) suggest that this is incorrect, 
and that there is some duration dependence. I also use the Feinstein and Keat- 
ing numbers to assess 
Probability(death  in year t + 1 I poor health in t). 
The most complex calculation I have performed in constructing tables 9.1 
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Probability(death  in year t + 1 1 good health in t) 
and 
Probability(death  in year t + 1 I moderately disabled health in f), 
neither of which can be drawn directly from Manton’s work, for reasons I dis- 
cussed above. To estimate these probabilities, I have modified Manton’s num- 
bers by  subtracting from each of the death probabilities he reports for these 
two health groups an estimate of  the probability that an individual of that 
health level first entered an institution (poor health in my model) and then died. 
The probability of death, given institutionalization, is set as follows: .5, men 
aged 65 to 74; .46, men aged 75 to 84; .48, men aged 85 to 90; .5, women aged 
65 to 74; .54, women aged 75 to 84; and .62, women aged 85 to 90. Since 
Manton’s sample shrinks with age, I have deduced this rate of shrinkage and, 
assuming constant proportionate reduction in sample size each year, deter- 
mined age weights. This step is necessary because, as shown in Feinstein and 
Keating’s table 1, the probability of nursing home entry varies with age. The 
shrinkage numbers are .88 per year for men aged 65 to 74 (no shrinkage); .88 
per year, men aged 75 to 90; .94 per year, women aged 65 to 74; .91 per year, 
women aged 75 to 84; .85 per year, women aged 85 to 90. For a shrinkage 
parameter k, for initial state i (good or moderately disabled), and for probabil- 
ity of death conditional on institutionalization  of 6,  I then computed 
P(poor health in t + 1 or t + 2 I i)~(~-‘) 
C ,,,(i-l)  P(death  1 i)  = Manton# -  6 
~ 
,=ages 
For future reference, I will refer to this computed probability as k,. 
Ultimately I wished to compare my  estimate of  these death probabilities 
based  on Manton’s  table with  the corresponding numbers in Feinstein and 
Keating. However, Feinstein and Keating, using data from National Life Ta- 
bles, do not divide the population into good health and moderately disabled 
health (they simply use noninstitutionalized versus institutionalized-a  divi- 
sion that is commonplace since separate death statistics are generally com- 
monly available only for nursing home patients, who are assumed, in  my 
model, to be in poor health). I have formed a weighted (by population) average 
of my modified Manton probabilities for the two health classes, good and mod- 
erately disabled, for  each  age  and  sex  class, and  compared  these to  the 
Feinstein and Keating numbers. For the most part the two different estimates 
are close, though not identical. I have generally chosen a number midway be- 
tween the two, and used that as my estimate of 
Probability(death  in t + 1 I  good or moderately disabled in t). 
This gives me a scaling factor for the Feinstein and Keating numbers, which 
are 1.17, men aged 65 to 74; 1.08, men aged 75 to 84; 1.06,  men aged 85 to 316  Jonathan S. Feinstein 
90; 1.7, women aged 65 to 74; 1.1, women aged 75 to 90. For reference below, 
I will denote the scaled Feinstein and Keating values as FKMOD. The number 
for women age 65 to 74 is so high because the probability of  death, when in 
good or moderately disabled health, is very low for this group, so that small 
errors in either set of numbers generate large proportionate differences. 
Having determined an estimate of 
Probability(death  in t + 1 I good or moderately disabled in r), 
I then decompose this into separate estimates of the probabilities for those in 
good health as opposed to those who are moderately disabled. I do this in 
several steps. First, since Manton’s figures suggest that the relative size of these 
two classes varies with age, I have determined weights that reflect these relative 
percentages; the weights, denoted w,  and w,  (they sum to one) are chosen to 
vary with age so as to smoothly interpolate between the average ratios within 
each age group. Second, I use my original modified estimates from Manton’s 
numbers of Probability(death  I good health) (A,)  and Probability(death I  mod- 
erately disabled) (A,)  to assess the relative chances of death in each class, 
and solve the following equation for A,: 
w,A,  + w,aA,  = FKMOD 
for each age and sex class. I then have values for each of  A,  and A,.  As a final 
step I smooth these probabilities over ages, so that they are nondecreasing. 
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COllllllent  Daniel L. McFadden 
In an ideal world without transactions costs, a household would adjust living 
arrangements instantaneously to provide the best possible environment, given 
the health status of its members. In the real world with substantial out-of- 
pocket and psychic costs of moving, there are substantive questions about the 
optimality of behavior, and the efficacy of policies that promote arrangements 
such as conjugate living  and life care. Questions of particular interest are 
whether households are rational in anticipating future declines in health status 
Daniel L. McFadden is professor of economics at the University of California at Berkeley and 
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or onset of disabilities, and how they handle the risk associated with fluctua- 
tions in health status. 
Jonathan Feinstein has undertaken a thought experiment that examines the 
mobility of decision makers confronted with probability distributions of future 
health status, and facing transactions costs for movement between living ar- 
rangements. For a simplified choice problem, he sets up a dynamic stochastic 
program that can be solved numerically  by backward recursion. Using a careful 
synthesis of knowledge on transition probabilities between health states, and a 
stylized characterization of living arrangements and payoffs to various health 
and living combinations, he describes lifetime mobility patterns as a function 
of  transactions costs. If  health distributions are measured accurately, then 
tastes can be estimated, formally or informally, by matching simulations from 
the dynamic stochastic program to observed mobility patterns. Transactions 
costs can also be estimated, provided there is enough variation in exogenous 
variables to permit identification. The fidelity of  a fitted model to observed 
mobility patterns allows testing of the hypothesis of life-cycle rationality. 
Feinstein’s paper is a useful first step in this research program, but it should 
be emphasized that it is only a first step. The paper does not systematically  fit 
the model to observed mobility patterns, or develop an econometric framework 
for doing so. There are several critical limitations that need to be addressed 
before the model can be applied seriously for empirical analysis. 
The model uses a stylized description of living arrangements, with catego- 
ries of independent, assisted, and institutionalized  housing. Feinstein contrasts 
the dominant role of assisted living in his simulations with the dominant role 
of  independent living in real data, and suggests that this may arise because 
individuals in truth fail to make appropriate strategic responses to declining 
health. However, it is premature to draw this conclusion before making a care- 
ful empirical definition of living arrangement categories that can be matched 
to data on elderly households. For example, a disabled individual living inde- 
pendently with a nondisabled spouse may be in at least as satisfactory an ar- 
rangement as a similar individual living in conjugate housing. The distinction 
between assisted living and institutionalization  is also blurred by the increas- 
ingly important “life care” category. For econometric and policy analysis, it 
would probably be more useful to define living arrangements using classifica- 
tions corresponding to census or other data set definitions,  or to medical insur- 
ance categories. 
The Feinstein model deals only with individual decision makers, and does 
not address the problem of  multiple-person households that share living ar- 
rangements, but may have different health levels. A number of complexities 
arise in this case. First, the adequacy of a living arrangement for an individual 
with a given level of disability depends not only on the physical facility, but 
also on the level of care that can be provided by other household members, and 
this in turn depends on their presence (e.g., working or at home) and health 
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combination of the utilities of each household member. Third, strategic evalua- 
tion of housing alternatives must take into account the joint probabilities of 
health state and survival of all household members. Fourth, the possibility of 
household dissolution via divorce, or separation via institutionalization  of one 
member, must be taken into account. 
The model does not contain any explicit costs of housing, or characterization 
of the impact of these costs on (indirect) atemporal utility. Thus, it cannot an- 
swer questions of how the adequacy of living arrangements  varies with income 
or wealth, or how mobility would change if, say, the effective cost of institu- 
tionalization fell. In fact, the distribution of  living arrangements is strongly 
correlated with wealth, and in surveys living expense is often cited as a leading 
factor in choice of living arrangements. 
The Feinstein model makes the assumption that living costs are entirely fi- 
nanced from an exogenous level of  current consumption expenditures. The 
model allows no discretionary  intertemporal substitution, and there is no inter- 
temporal budget constraint that influences choice of living arrangements.  Thus, 
the model cannot account for effects like precautionary savings motives that 
lead households to preserve wealth by  postponing moves to more expensive 
living arrangements, or retention of owner-occupied housing that is protected 
from Medicaid spend-down provisions. 
The model assumes that utility levels for each combination of health status 
and living arrangement are invariant with age. This implies that the effects of 
age on tastes operate solely through health status. While this is not implausible, 
it is a substantive hypothesis that needs to be checked. 
The model considers several interesting alternative forms for transactions 
costs, including the possibility that they have transitory or permanent impacts 
on utility, or that they operate by modifying the (possibly subjective) probabili- 
ties of change in health status. However, it does not consider exogenous vari- 
ables, such as age or location of family members, that may be related to trans- 
actions  costs  and  may  be  used  to  identify  its  effects,  and  it  does  not 
parameterize or characterize  transactions costs in dollar equivalents that would 
aid their economic interpretation. 
The classification of health in the model (as good, moderate, poor, or dead) 
is relatively crude. One could, alternatively, seek one or more indices of health 
that weight ADLs and IADLs to isolate disabilities that require adjustments in 
living arrangements, or that by  some criterion maximize the correlation of 
health status and housing choice. From the standpoint of simulating solutions 
to the dynamic stochastic program, it should make little difference whether 
health status is characterized as a discrete or continuous variable. 
The model assumes that health status transitions follow a first-order Markov 
process. There is in fact considerable evidence for unobserved heterogeneity 
in the population, with “frail” individuals having permanently higher probabil- 
ities of transition to poor health states than “robust” ones. Either inherited ge- 
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be they exogenous or the result of  behavior, will induce heterogeneity. One 
consequence of  heterogeneity is that the Markov model will predict more 
“churning” among health states than actually occurs. A numerical example 
makes the point: Suppose a stationary population with half “frail” and half 
“robust” individuals, and “good” and “bad” health states. Assume the transi- 
tion probabilities satisfy P(G I G,R) = 0.9, P(G I  B,R) = 0.5, P(G I  G,F) = 
0.5,  P(G I B,F) = 0.1. The Markov transition probabilities that would be in- 
ferred from one-period rates are P(G  I G)  =  P (B  I  B)  = 0.7. Then, the Markov 
model predicts that 9% of the population will switch health states twice in two 
periods, whereas in fact this will happen for only 5%. As a result, the Markov 
model will lead to a prediction of higher mobility rates, or higher transactions 
costs in order to match observed mobility rates, than a model that correctly 
accounts for heterogeneity. If  individuals know whether they are “frail,” then 
this heterogeneity will also induce heterogeneity in behavior, with individuals 
less willing to switch housing to match an excursion from their “normal” 
health state. 
In conclusion, the Feinstein paper carries out a thought experiment that 
identifies anomalies in patterns of health and housing mobility, and concen- 
trates on the role of transactions costs in explaining these anomalies. This is a 
useful approach to explaining housing decisions of the elderly. Further devel- 
opment of the model, along some of the lines suggested in this comment, are 
needed to make it sufficiently realistic to be a serious policy tool. 